

SECRET

A-16-88-46

ROLANDO MASFERRER, JR.

**BUSINESS:**

Subject is the Vice President of Sales at the following Corporation:

A168762 - Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. E-17-260

Document Description: \_\_\_\_\_

Dated: 27 May 77

Document Located By: DDO  
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: \_\_\_\_\_

*Sanitized. Would  
Result in indirect  
Denial.*

RECOMMEND:

- Release in full-text
- Release in sanitized form
- Deny in toto
- Defer decision to \_\_\_\_\_
- Coordination with \_\_\_\_\_ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from a foreign liaison service	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (e)
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<input type="checkbox"/> Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (e)
<input type="checkbox"/> Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(j) (1) (f)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1) (c)
* <input type="checkbox"/> Other, specify:		

\*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HSI-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

*Rec'd 5/24/77*  
DDO  
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

*May 77*

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_  
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: \_\_\_\_\_

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Contact Division  
ATTN: Special Agent

DATE: 22 May 60

FROM : Chief, Contact Division

SUBJECT: Interview with Walter Joe, German Patient at HHS Hospital, Detroit

1. Walter Joe, born at Wichawa, N.Y., 17 Jul 19, called the Detroit Field Office on the afternoon of 16 Aug 60 and requested an interview. He said he had information as to whom "we'd help us". In response to his request, a SAC called on him this afternoon at the hospital.

2. Physically, Joe gave the appearance of having been down on his back for some time. He is reported to be a Venezuelan citizen, and his wife and two children live in Maracaibo. He is a sugar operator by profession. He arrived in the U.S. on his first trip in late May in Cleveland on or about 11 August, and has been at the Detroit HHS Hospital since that date. He carries passport no. 250770, re-validated at Maracaibo, Venezuela on 17 Jul 59. Joe has a sister-in-law, Anna Rodriguez, whom he describes as a full-time newspaperwoman of Maracaibo, and a member of the Union Democrática. The following is the gist of what he said in the course of the two and a half hour interview.

3. Communist-banned John Bruno Hernandez through his sister-in-law, Joe met in 1951 a Cuban newspaperman by the name of Ferna, a reporter for the Diario del Occidente of Maracaibo. Ferna introduced him to people connected with an anti-Castro movement, composed mainly of Nicaraguan exiles in Venezuela. Joe makes the impression that they would have employed him, but he found out the movement was backed by the Communist Party of Venezuela, and so he dropped them.

4. Shortly after his meeting with the anti-Castroists, Joe came in contact with a Professor [Name], Director of the Collegio Jose Martí, and head of the Comité de Defensa de Maracaibo. Gonzalez was under the impression that Joe was an ex-Castro agent, and expressed an interest in using him to run arms into Cuba, to supply the Castro forces. This was prior to the Batista overthrow of January 1959.

5. Joe took a job in Miami, working on contract on a dredging operation. In Miami in July 1960, he met a man Jose Nicolas Hernandez, who introduced him to Antonio Hernandez, leader of an anti-Castro group. Hernandez took Joe into the group and told him he would want to employ him when he got in the dredging operation again. Hernandez, according to Joe, was the agent who dispatched the "boarding party" consisting of Jose, Manuel, and Walter, all of whom were caught and deported shortly after their landing in Cuba. Joe says Hernandez was introduced to him by Antonio Hernandez, but a letter was written in connection of the boarding party. Joe is unavailably. Hernandez said that Antonio Hernandez and Jose and Walter had to be sent in water to Camaguey and Matanzas. Hernandez arrived there, he said, in contact with Antonio Hernandez and Jose and Walter.

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6. One's opinion of Miral's manager is not. He stated that Miral is an immigrant, who is only allowed to work in the hotel industry and that he may be seen get out of the country. Miral's wife lives in a brother in Cuba who is a doctor. he told Volante that he was a member of the group who attacked the Cuban Consul in the Consulate in Miami, the report was received that Mares, Miller and the group were in the execution of the attack and is a "top-level man".

7. When G... was being searched and he was finally available to enter the Masferrer group and then he was a fellow by the name of Harry... in the company of Miral and Miral's brother. Harry... is a former... and works with a much more pronounced accent than Miral's. Harry had an office in the same building as the Cuban Consulate, and seemed to act as a translator for Masferrer, as well as a provider of weapons on a small scale. Harry apparently had serious Marxist views, and he swindled two of the members of the Masferrer militia out of \$100 each on the pretext of taking their chests from home to have them cashed for them.

8. Murder of Russ Masher When Masferrer started actively recruiting Americans... among them were Harry Masher, who claimed to be an ex-police officer formerly in the service of Castro. One night he was in a bar next to the Masferrer task force's barracks at 109... West with Masher, Juan (also known as Elastico) and a former member of the Castro secret police, whom he could not name. There were many other Cubans and Americans as well. Juan was a Portuguese who claimed to have entered the US legally at Key West after jumping the Havana-Hayward Ferry. His nickname derived from his musical talents, he also claimed to have had no military experience, but he proved to adept at military tactics that he later became second in command of the task force. The former Castro secret policeman was in his early 20's, about six-foot tall, husky build and claimed to have been a schoolteacher. In the course of the evening at the bar, one of the three - Masher, Juan, or the ex-secret policeman - made the remark that, on the occasion of their leaving in Cuba, they should break away from the Masferrer group and try to join up with some other. One overheard the remark and reported it to the task force leader, though he said he could not identify which of the three had said it. The ex-secret policeman was promptly thrown out of the task force, but Masher was also strongly suspected of being the author of the dissident remark. As a result of this suspicion, Masher was not allowed to take any firearms with him when the group went into training on No-Hua Key. One, however, was allowed to take a .25 pistol. Besides One's weapon, the only other firearms at No-Hua initially were a 12-gauge shotgun and a .32 rifle. Masher was unable to keep up with the rigorous physical training schedule of the group, and so absented himself from that part of the training. Masher adopted the habit of rising early in the morning and going out to hunt in the woods, having managed somehow to appropriate the .32 rifle. Because of his general attitude toward the training, plus the suspicion that surrounded him as the possible author of the dissident remark in the Miami bar, an acute bitterness grew between him and the group leader at No-Hua, Agua, also known as El Negro. Agua was a former Batista police sergeant who had been tried and condemned to death in absentia. Agua proposed shooting it out with Masher, but Masher declined the invitation. Masferrer visited No-Hua once in the company of Jose..., an ex-C.I. who had served in Korea. Masferrer brought with him a .45 service automatic and a .30-06 rifle. These guns were lost by Masferrer, upon his departure the next day. In the company of Jose... who had been a Batista man in Batista's army and claimed to have killed ... Company was married to an American woman who lived in Miami. Masher arose early the morning and went hunting. According to his custom. About breakfast time, the man in the camp heard shots, and then...

M. H. ... 7/2/53

...the trail to the ... ..

9. MIL Bishop and CIA informant About two days after Bishop's discovery the ... ..

10. Other members of the Masferrer group includes Henry Brown, ... ..

11. Breaking of the Masferrer group occurred around early January 1961. When Masferrer was asked by the police to close up the barracks ... ..

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of some means. One of them was left in a group before the payoff. The group, a crew of five men, was sent out for a week, hoping to reach a "beach" camp there. The group, after navigation, apparently, was picked up instead of having a boat. They were arrested and sentenced to 30 years each. Gee adds a possibility that some of the six was a woman. Another small group of the ex-convicts stole a boat and fled with the intention of sailing to Cuba. They were picked up by Miami police before they got out of the harbor.

12. Anti-Castro Mercenary Activities, in the Miami area, according to Gee, is under the direction of James Fernandez, of the Cuban organization. His residence is on S.W. 1st and 19th Aves., Miami. Gee says she promises, or makes, money and sees to their delivery on target.

13. General-Manager Anti-Castro Plot: (Gee says that he gave the following information to the FBI on 1/15/61 in response to his phone call sometime early this year to the FBI office in Miami.) Sometime early this year, Gee was walking about the city, he met a man named Howard Davis, who upon hearing that Gee was interested in returning to his family in Caracas, introduced him to one Luiz Phillips Prado of 1955 Collins Ave., Miami. Prado arranged an interview for Gee with a General Casanova, who was entrusted to him as the head of the anti-Castro movement in Miami. Casanova asked Gee and Davis if they would - on 30 days notice - organize and arm a group of 400 ex-C.I.'s. He offered Gee and Davis that unlimited cash would be at their disposal for the task. Casanova said all kinds of arms would be needed, including machine and flame throwers. He was most interested in whether or not Gee and Davis had any channel for procuring the arms. They assured Casanova they could raise the 400 men and obtain the desired arms and equipment. Casanova said he had already arranged transportation for the force via commercial airlines, that they would be flown to a mountain site "training" facilities. Having the US disguised as soldiers, and they would be given 30 days rigorous training under the direction of Japanese-speaking Venezuelan army officers. Casanova explained that the tentative plan was for an attack by the 400 on Caracas, simultaneously with an Army revolt within the city and at other unexplained points. The attempted coup in early 1961, involving an attack on Radio Marti, resulted in the arrest of several army officers involved in the Casanova plot, and according to Prado, necessitated an indefinite delay. Prado told Gee, however, that Fernandez was still interested in the plan, and that it would be carried out.

14. Caracas with arrangements: Thomas J. BO Salgado, who lives with Rafael Salgado, a relative of the ex-convicts. Gee met BO Salgado, former owner of the hotel Wash in Miami. Salgado told Gee that, if he were provided with one thousand dollars cash for expenses, he would go to Caracas and buy any kind of arms needed, and he would guarantee delivery to any part of the world. Another gun-runner with whom he came in contact was Charlie Adams, 1040 N. 9th Ave., Miami, telephone number MA 4-2464. Adams could obtain, for \$15.00 cash on minimum orders of one thousand, a weapon described as Anti-Air (aircraft), with NATO ammunition. Another arms dealer whom Gee contacted was Hal Castle, 2211 SW 1st St., Miami, telephone CR 2-629. He provided Gee with a list of surplus US arms which he could obtain in any quantities desired.

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JAMES R. ...

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FOIA/ISS Request No. F 77-260

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Dated: \_\_\_\_\_

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Document referred to DDO for review by: \_\_\_\_\_

RECOMMEND:

- \_\_\_\_\_ Release in full-text
- \_\_\_\_\_ Release in sanitized form
- \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in toto
- \_\_\_\_\_ Defer decision to \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordination with \_\_\_\_\_ prior to above denial/release

*only referred to DDO -  
 fragments*

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COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DCD  
 SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE

*May 77*

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 (To be completed by ISS/PI(G))

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The general contents of information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sec. 793 and 794, and the transmission or the revelation of such information in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

0-0-0-1-0-0-0-0-0-0

COUNTRY	CUBA	REPORT NO.	
SUBJECT	THE STAFF OF THE MINISTRY OF THE ISLE OF PINOS PRISON, ISLE OF PINOS, CUBA	DATE DIED	
		NO. PAGES	3
REFERENCES			
DATE OF INFO	12-21-60	<i>Eduardo Suarez Rivas</i> 4766 Alton Road,	
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Isle of Pinos, Pinar del Rio, Cuba		
THIS IS UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION - <i>Miami, Fla.</i>			

SOURCE

1. The following US citizens were in Circular #2, Isle of Pinos Prison, as of 24 Dec 60:
  - a. Robert John Santillo, age 33-35, 6'2", 150 lbs, brown eyes and hair, divorced; home address: 13517 Lakota Ave, Cleveland, Ohio. He was caught in the Copacabana Hotel, Miramar, Havana, in December 1960 for being a counterrevolutionary. He allegedly belonged to a secret anti-Castro movement. He was supposed to have helped in an uprising in the Escambray Mountains in early 1961. He is serving a 15-year prison term. He is in urgent need of medical care, has a stomach ulcer, and is losing weight daily. He has lost 70 lbs since he has been in prison. I saw him before I left. He is nothing but skin and bones.
  - b. Eustace Eubank, age 37-40, 6'0", 150 lbs, dark brown eyes and hair; married; home address: 3315 Doolittle Blvd, Baltimore, Md. He was caught on north coast of Cuba because of counterrevolutionary activities in 1961 traveling in a yacht with seven or eight other Americans. He is serving a 15 to 20-year prison term. He has lost some weight but otherwise is doing fine. I saw him and talked to him before I left.
  - c. Peter Leichter, age 24, 5'10", 175 lbs, dirty blond hair, brown eyes and glasses; home address: Nassau, Bahamas. His father is an American residing in the Bahamas; his mother is English. He was an airplane pilot and water skiing and scuba diving instructor in the Bahamas. He was caught in the Pinar del Rio Mountains, in the summer of 1960 fighting with a group of anti-Castro guerrillas. He is not a very intelligent boy and keeps to himself. Walks with a limp caused by an airplane accident.

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GROUP 1  
UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08/14/01 BY 60322/UC/STP

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another US citizen in the Dept or St Johns Hotel in Havana in 1961 planting a telephone and wire recorder in the wall between his apartment and that of a Chinese diplomat. The engineer, I believe, was either Samuel or Joe Green. He is also serving a 15-year term at Isle of Pines.

4. John Lewis, 31-32, 5'9", 175 lbs, brown eyes, black hair; home address: Box 40, 127th St, Franklinville, North Carolina. He may be the engineer who was caught with Hernandez mentioned above. He also kept to himself. His health is fair. He is also serving a 15- to 20-year term.

5. Joe Green, 30-32, 5'8", 160 lbs, brown hair and eyes; home address unknown. He is very quiet, soft-spoken, well-educated, keeps to himself. He may have been the electrical engineer who was caught with Hernandez. He is also serving a long prison term.

6. Leonardo, 21 years old, 5'8", 150 lbs, dirty blond hair, blue eyes; high school graduate; home address unknown. He is very healthy, quiet, played chess all the time, served with the US group. He was one of the seven caught in the yacht with the US citizens on the north coast of Cuba with Durban. He is serving a 15- to 20-year prison term for counterrevolutionary activities.

7. Albert Gibson, 30-32, 5'8", 150 lbs, fair health, Southern accent, fair education. Kept with the rest of the US citizens. I believe he has also caught in the same yacht with Durban. He is also serving a long prison term.

8. Richard Allen Ferraro, 30-32, 5'8", 150 lbs, dark brown hair, blue eyes; home address unknown. He is completely crazy, of irrational behavior, tried to escape in one of the big trash cans. Has had several operations, fits. He has been in the hospital several times. Two prisoners who are psychiatrists have been trying to help him, but in vain. He urgently needs psychiatric help. He was allegedly caught in the Esmeralda incident and arrested for being a counterrevolutionary. He was caught in late 1960 or early 1961, is serving a 15-year term. Sometimes goes around all day talking to himself.

9. Walter, 30-32, 5'8", 160 lbs, brown eyes and hair, naturalized US citizen (Cuban parents). Korean War veteran. His wife (Lucy) and two daughters are residing in Miami. He is in fair health, lost a lot of weight. He was arrested in Havana in 1961 for being a counterrevolutionary.

10. Michael (last), 30-32, 5'8", 150 lbs, light-brown hair, blue eyes, Korean War veteran, a Southerner, high school education. He was also caught in the yacht with Durban, who was allegedly working for Rolando Masferrer. He worked in a New York resort center before getting to Cuba.

11. These are all the US citizens that I know about who are at the Isle of Pines Prison now.

5/16/63  
S/1/163

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Document Description: CONFIDENTIAL

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RECOMMEND:

- \_\_\_\_\_ Release in full-text
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- \_\_\_\_\_ Defer decision to \_\_\_\_\_
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COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Richard Smith DCD  
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE  
1 01  
May 77

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_  
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This report contains information of a confidential nature and is to be controlled in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 11652 and the provisions of the Intelligence Security Act of 1950.

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

COUNTRY ORIGIN	REPORT NO.
ASSGT: Intelligence, Cuban Individuals and Special CIA Assets Army Employees in the Hemisphere Other in Havana	DATE DISTR.
NO. PAGES 2	NO. PAGES 2
DATE OF REPORT	REFERENCES
Aug 12 - Sep 12	Beat from Valera A-12-356-261 G-2 G-2 G-2
DATE ACQ. BY	

UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION

SOURCE



The majority of the Cuban employees in the Dominican Embassy were bona fide workers of the Dominican regime. However, during the time I served as secretary of the Embassy I observed that some men and women of dubious reputation entered the Embassy as political refugees. The following are those whom I consider to be undesirable: Manuel Jimena, organizer of the G-2 activities in the Isle of Pines and who executed many opponents of the regime, entered the Embassy to avoid being arrested for G-2 related activities and embarrassment of public fame. Jimena is an accomplished bully and terrorized the rest of the employees with his reckless display of weapons he brought into the Embassy. As far as I know he is still in the Embassy.

2. Juan Garcia Hernandez, a hired killer who was one of the most notorious members of the army known as "Los Tigres" led by former Senator Rolando Masferrer. Evaristo Garcia Mesa, a professional gambler, who organized gambling within the Embassy of Juan Francisco Garcia, Jr. Garcia and his son are in Miami. Manuel del Real, a notorious gambler who was in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco and the Dominican Republic. Juan del Real has been in Miami for some time.

3. Juan del Real, a notorious gambler who was in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco and the Dominican Republic. Juan del Real has been in Miami for some time. Juan del Real, a notorious gambler who was in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco and the Dominican Republic. Juan del Real has been in Miami for some time. Juan del Real, a notorious gambler who was in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco and the Dominican Republic. Juan del Real has been in Miami for some time.

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

-2-

1. Assume Smith, a member of a wealthy family from Charlotte de Cuba, served as  
 prosecutor attorney during the early days of the Revolution, and sent many  
 Cubans to the firing squad. This man and his family are residing in Miami.  
Jane, a wealthy Cuban woman who kept the G-2 informal con-  
 cealing the spy's activities.

-cont-

*Handwritten:*  
 T. W. [unclear]  
 [unclear]  
 [unclear]

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
SECRET

TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division  
ATTN : Support Branch  
FROM : Chief, Miami Field Office  
SUBJECT: Plan to Unite the Cuban Exiles




DATE: 10-11-1963

CLASS(C) - 1-10

1. At their request, Luis S. Rodriguez met with Dr. Ricardo Rafael Sardinas, secretary of the Cuban Bene Planners Association in exile and with Juan ~~...~~ Cuban Senator and editor of the Spanish language weekly newspaper "El Periodico del Aire". ~~...~~ advised that they have been seeing with several personalities of the exile colony in an effort to organize all the exiles into a single group which will represent all the exiles regardless of former affiliations.
2. They feel that after the sorry specifics provided by the Cuban Revolutionary Council, they must avoid getting involved in matters which are in conflict with the policies of the US Government. Therefore, they would like to organize this project with Mr. John Grimms.
3. The following personalities have been approached and have indicated their desire to cooperate to the fullest extent in an effort to unite all the Cubans in exile: Antonio Manuel de Vargas, Dr. Julio Escarot, Dr. Carlos Erio, Dr. Carlos Manuel Sperling, Carlos Riva, Jose Ignacio Riquelme, Jose Alvarado Diaz, Raul Gonzalez, Marciano Sanchez, Santiago Luis, Jose Manuel Ariza, Rosario Roca, Rosario Lizaso, Orlando Sergio Calzon, Jose Ignacio Barro, Walter Gomez, Alfonso Rosell, Vital Corrao, George Rubio, Lombardo Diaz, Santiago Alvarez, Ruben de Leon. Also included in this roster are General Generoso Gomez Arguedas, veteran of the War of Independence, and Fernando Rivas, leader of the Transportation Workers, because both are Negroes.
4. Representatives of the Medical Association, Bar Association, Teacher and Newspaper Associations and the Students Directory have also been contacted and indicated their desire to assist in this endeavor.
5. Arado and Sardinas stress that former President Erio indicated that former members of the Castro regime who are exiled in the US should also be invited to join because their presence in the organization will indicate to the people of Cuba that the aim of the organization is not the return to certain conditions that prevailed before Jan 58. Dr. Erio maintains that with former fidelists joining the organization the members of the "Castro" army and the militia plus the Government bureaucracy will not fear reprisals if and when the Castro regime is unseated. Dr. Erio added that with names such as Felipe Larra, Raul Roca, Arguedas, Raul Gaitan and even controversial Manolo Ray, the chances of acceptance by members of the Armed Forces will increase.

Approved: [Signature]





CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

6. The organization will also invite to join any prominent persons who served under the Batista Administration and who were given a clean bill of health after the Revolution. However, such persons, especially like Colonel Antonio Murguía, Colonel Amador, Armando, Trenado Garcia and others, will not be admitted. Manoyo and his group will not be invited because they are considered to be agent provocateurs.

7. If this works out, the new organization will be ruled by a five man board selected by a general assembly of all the above mentioned personalities. The chairmanship of the board will be rotated periodically.

*152*  
JUSTIN S. GELBERMAN

LRRodriguez:cs

cc: SAS, Miami

*SAS  
29 April 63  
7200*

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CONFIDENTIAL

*29 April 63*

UNCLASSIFIED     CONFIDENTIAL     SECRET     TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. E 17-260

Document Description: \_\_\_\_\_

Dated: July 1977

Document Located By: DCD  
OFFICE DESIGNATION

Document referred to DDO for review by: \_\_\_\_\_  
*Representative*

RECOMMEND:

- \_\_\_\_\_ Release in full-text
- \_\_\_\_\_ Release in sanitized form
- Deny in toto
- \_\_\_\_\_ Defer decision to \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordination with \_\_\_\_\_ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	<u>FOIA</u>	<u>PRIVACY</u>
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from a foreign liaison service	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)(c)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(e)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> File number	(b) (2)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(e)
<input type="checkbox"/> Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1)(b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(j) (1)(F)
<input type="checkbox"/> Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1)(c)
* <input type="checkbox"/> Other, specify:		

\*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

*Parsons*

*DCD*

SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER'S OFFICE

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_  
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

*May 77*

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: \_\_\_\_\_

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CONFIDENTIAL

16-88-46

Chief, Washington Field Office

12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OCS)

A-168346

A-168762

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : Van Happer/Masulin telecons

A-127900

1. Attached per referent telephone conversations is copy of Dun and Bradstreet report as requested on Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Dunwoody, Georgia. Please note that Chairman of the Board, is Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III. Werbell is a former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer known to this writer during assignments in China during WWII.

2. This Agency, as well as other government agencies, have considerable information on Werbell. He is an old and unsavory, unsolicited, contact of the Miami Field Office dating from 1959. He is of dubious character and reputation who had and has been involved in grandiose schemes and international arms deals. He has had perpetual financial difficulties.

3. Werbell was involved with Rolando Masferrer Senior, in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion in 1957. This may throw a different light on possible source development of young Rolando Jr. Any approach to him should be executed with some degree of caution. We do not desire to get involved with Werbell. However, we cannot foresee any objection to planned debriefings of Masferrer Jr., following his trips to Latin America and other areas, in pursuit of FPI and possible information of operational significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment

114

cc: Services Division (Control)

FILED: ER 23880

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON APPROVAL OF DCI

CLASSIFIED BY 42-1445

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE BY (1), (2), (3) OR (4)

SENSITIVE INFORMATION SOURCES INVOLVED

Control / Paul  
CC Washington  
28 Jul 72  
Jhr

16-88-46

7 July 1972.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

A 168846

SUBJECT: Assessment of Recruitability - Rolando Masferrer, Jr.  
Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corporation  
and Associated with Defense Systems Incorporated

A168762

1. Subject seems to have inherited that particular Latin American penchant for involvement in covert political activities. However, the Subject's involvement is not merely pastime or recreation but it is instead intimately connected with his chosen profession as an arms salesman. Here the phrase "for fun and profit" seems aptly suited. He seems to be a man of action with the ability to exploit an opportunity, rather than a towering intellect.

2. Subject has excellent contacts and access in Latin America. This access developed from his extended family, professional appointments, and his involvement with Cuban exile groups. His family is well-known (infamous) throughout many sectors of Latin America and opens many doors for him (although it also closes others). It should also be mentioned that his family has recently developed a rather checkered association with this Agency. The particular nature of his military products gives him contact with high military, police, and security officials throughout Latin America. He seems to be well versed on the status of various arms deals (both official and under-the-table) in the countries he travels. He has been involved with several Cuban exile political and para-military organizations.

3. Politically, Subject is a staunch anti-Communist. This position is probably ingrained from his family, but also reinforced from his various political and professional activities. He has voiced a particular hatred for Cuban Communists. He seems to view them not as respected enemies, but as hated traitors. He is vehemently anti-Castro.

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4. Subject has developed what could be interpreted as a certain patriotism for this country. During conversations he referred a few times to "my country" meaning the U.S. I believe that the fact he volunteered for U.S. military training reflects not only the selfish motives of becoming Special Forces qualified but also a sense of duty. I also believe that his recent statements to me regarding international security matters is not merely empty loquacity but is evidence of his desire to contribute something and become involved in the national interest.

5. Subject would need sober briefings on the responsibility of any Agency association as well as subsequent careful handling. He would need to get away from the "Flagler Street Commando syndrome" of visual and verbal bravado. He would need instruction to discern rumor from fact, to identify sources, and to assess the reliability of acquired information.

6. I am sure that the Subject is recruitable. The question is what degree of association with the Agency would be appropriate. If the decision is made to approach the Subject, may I suggest that his association be initially limited to Agency briefings and debriefings before and after his trips to Latin America. Once his reliability is established and the accuracy of his reporting is proven then further utilization may be possible. Since his financial situation seems to be secure I am sure he could be handled on a non-pay basis.

7. Subject is scheduled to leave on a two-week business trip to Venezuela and Colombia beginning in early August 1972. He claimed to have appointments with a Venezuelan Air Force General and with Venezuelan national security officials in DISIP.

[REDACTED]

Chief, Washington Field Office

16. 77-40  
16 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service, OSS

Rolando Masferrer, Jr. - Possible Source Lead *A*

1. Attached for your information and whatever interest you may have in this source lead from VH/3/Venezuela [redacted].

2. On the basis of the information submitted, Mr. Masferrer, Jr., may be a useful source of FPI.

3. Suggest you arrange contact to obtain routine biographic data to initiate security checks; determine his intelligence potential and explain the DCS mission, without revealing in any way the past relationship with Mr. Peterson. Subject's personality profile appears to be very interesting.

4. It appears that the Clandestine Service is not repeat not interested in subject's operational potential at this time. We leave this in your capable hands to determine what course of action you may wish to contemplate in this matter.

JAMES R. MURPHY

[redacted] /dan  
cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed: HH 23880

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downgrading and  
declassification

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12 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando MASFERRER, Jr.

1. Please be informed of a possible future contact--Rolando MASFERRER, Jr., recently promoted to Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Washington D.C. office, 905 L' Enfant Plaza, #4020. He is also associated with Parabellum Corporation, another military weapons firm. Subject, born approximately 1945, in Habana, Cuba, is believed to be a naturalized citizen.
2. Subject makes frequent sales trips to Latin America. Because of the nature of his main product(machine pistols with silencers) he has good access to top Latin American governmental officials and military and security officers. He has personally met many Latin American presidents. He should be a good source of information on the current status of arms sales in Latin America; internal security, military armament levels, order-of-battle, and internal politics in host countries; and, if needed, status of Cuban exile movement. He is presently on a sales mission to Colombia and is scheduled to return in mid-June.
3. MASFERRER, Jr. has been a Miami resident since 1959 and more recently lived in Atlanta. He will permanently locate in the Washington, D.C. area when he returns from his Colombian trip.
4. Subject is not to be confused with his father by the same name, the infamous Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER y Rojas(201-42669). Masferrer Sr. was a former Cuban Senator and leader of a dreaded private army of Batista enforcers called "Los Tigres(The Tigers)". He is presently serving in a U.S. federal prison for attempting to organize a 1957 invasion of Haiti in order to set up a base of operations against Cuba. Masferrer Sr., violently anti-Castro, was involved in numerous Cuban exile operations against Cuba during the last decade.
5. I was Subject's Commanding Officer in the Florida National Guard and sometimes saw him socially while in Miami. Although Cuban by birth, he now feels that he is an American. Politically anti-Communist, he joined the National Guard(while not under duress from the draft) to become a "Green Baret." He is polite and correct in his social relationships. I received a letter from him, 7 June 1972, informing me of his impending move to the Washington, D.C. area. He

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solicited my aid in finding a local army reserve unit.

6. If you are interested in exploring this possibility further, please feel free to contact me at any time. I could suggest cautions and method of contact or introduction. Subject is unwitting of my Agency employment.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

WH/3/V

Orig. & 2

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Chief, Washington Field Office

28 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)

B-67-52

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Possible Source Lead

#  
168846

REFERENCES: A) Memorandum for the Record dated 12 June 1972; Same Subject  
B) Van Happer/Masulin telecon

1. In regard to referent telephone conversation of recent date, we asked [redacted] (WH/3/Venezuela) for additional information regarding [redacted], Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Headquartered in Georgia.

2. [redacted] is a young "career trainee" who has been with the Agency for about six months. He met Masferrer in Miami, Florida, where both belonged to a Florida National Guard Unit. [redacted] knows Masferrer socially as well having met frequently for "snacks and beer".

3. According to [redacted], based on his observations, subject is a personable, intelligent, individual who appears trustworthy, and of sound mind and judgment. He is a solid citizen completely assimilated in the American mainstream; intensely interested in the U.S. political processes. Politically, he is of moderate conservative persuasion. He is an astute businessman of demonstrated ability and integrity. To highlight this point, [redacted] mentioned that Masferrer spurned lucrative cash offers for "under the table" deals to engage in illegal weapons trade in Latin America. He refused these offers to operate in legitimate business circles.

4. Young Rolando takes a sociable drink; has no known bad habits. He has a keen eye for attractive females, but no more so than all healthy males. [redacted] said he would not hesitate to recommend subject for a position of trust and confidence.

5. Rolando Masferrer, Jr. served with the Green Berets, elite U.S. Army unit whose members require special security clearances by the military.

6. [redacted] underlined his previous statement that Rolando should not be confused with his father, Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, a former Cuban Senator who was leader of the notorious "Los Tigres", the dreaded army of enforcers under Batista.

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Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
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7. [ ] believed, and we are inclined to agree, that Bolando Jr., may be a good candidate for source development. He will be located at 905 L'Enfant Plaza, Washington, D.C., as the representative of Military Armaments Co. He will also represent Parabellum Corporation another military weapons firm.

8. Dun and Bradstreet reports were requested from New York and a copy will be forwarded when received.

JAMES R. MURPHY

[ ]/lll  
cc: Services Division (Control)  
FILED: HR 2380  
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16-88-46

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS																																										
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Rolando MASPERRER 6080 W. Flagler Avenue Miami, Florida													GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER																													
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						X									HH 25263 WHICOG/OS 49 '46 ATTN CIVILIS 404KMSB-040 Yglesias is certainly a fraud and should come to the attention of the FBI and police authorities. Masperrer should also be known to your office since we sent some background info on him to Miami F.O. He is a slick operator. Bring caution in your dealings with him.																											
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Our [ ] colleagues wish us to report on Iglesias and record these developments.																																										
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

CLASSIFICATION  
S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. [ ]

DATE

COUNTRY Colombia/Venezuela/Guatemala

NO. PAGES 2

SUBJECT Guillermo Iglesias/Efforts to Raise Money Under Alleged Agency Auspices

REFERENCES

### OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

1. On 26 June 1973 the [ ] Office responded to a call on the listed line from a man who identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. Mr. Masferrer requested to meet with [ ] of the [ ] Office. Mr. Masferrer said that he had some information concerning one Guillermo Iglesias (subject of [ ]) that would prove to be of interest to the Central Intelligence Agency. Rolando Masferrer lives at 6080 W. Flagler Avenue, Miami, Florida. As a result of his request [ ] and [ ] of the [ ] Office responded to the call and met with Rolando Masferrer that afternoon.
2. Mr. Masferrer related details of his relationship with one Guillermo Iglesias, age about 38, an individual on whom there are other Agency references. According to Masferrer, Iglesias approached him in late March 1973 and identified himself as working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Iglesias said that he was trying to raise a large sum of money to finance secret CIA operations. Iglesias said that CIA funds have been tied up as a result of the Watergate affair. He referred to these operations as black operations. Mr. Masferrer said that he knew several high ranking government officials in Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala. Masferrer contacted several of these friends in South America and asked them to aid the Central Intelligence Agency in raising funds for secret operations in South America and the Caribbean. Masferrer has contacted Manuel Vega, a retired Colombian army colonel and presently head of the Colombian Internal Police. He has also contacted one Alvaro Vargas, who is an advisor in armaments to the Colombian National Police. Masferrer also passed Iglesias the name of Carlos Fabri, head of the Venezuela Internal Police. Iglesias showed a great interest in small arms of all types. Masferrer said that he personally turned over five M-26 fragmentation hand grenades, one M-16 automatic rifle, one AR-15 semi-automatic rifle, and several handguns 38 caliber type. Masferrer was led to believe that the weapons would be used in a secret CIA operation in Puerto Rico. This operation was described by Iglesias as a black operation.
3. During our conversation with Masferrer, he raised an additional point. Masferrer said that he contacted Manuel Vega in Colombia and that Vega agreed to help all that he could. Vega expressed deep concern to

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Classified by: 007627  
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E. O. 11652, exemption category: 38(7). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

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Masferrer because, according to him, any time the US Embassy people in Bogota were passed information the Colombian guerrillas were somehow informed. Vega told Masferrer that he believed a leak had developed in the US Embassy and that the "Embassy boys" could no longer be trusted.

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16-88-46

PROCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS																																							
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E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)														45		TYPE OO-E				46																			
Rolando Masferrer c/o Daniel Bermudez 6080 W. Flagler, Apt 17 Miami, Florida																GRAPHICS, MAPS, PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, OTHER				DISSEMINATED																			
F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)														47		SUBJECT				48																			
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G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)														49		2. TOO GENERAL				55 56																			
S -																3. DATA SUPPLIED BY OTHER AGENCIES				57 58																			
H. METHOD OF COLLECTION														59		EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM				60																			
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Our [ ] colleagues have asked us to report this brief item in order to put it in the system.																WH/C/CI 3-D-46				7-014A																			
I believe your caller was Rolando Masferrer, friend of the nephew of the famous Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y. Rivas, serving in a US prison for organizing (1967) Panamanian Revolution. Stay clear of Rolando (I don't know) who will send you home background.																																							
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

CLASSIFICATION  
S-E-C-R-E-T

REPORT NO. [ ]

DATE 26 May 1973

COUNTRY Cuba/Haiti

NO. PAGES 1

SUBJECT Possible False Recruitment Effort

REFERENCES

### OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

1. At 1700 hours on 14 May 1973 the [ ] Office received a telephone call on the listed line from an individual who ultimately identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. It is believed that Masferrer is identical with former Cuban senator and Batista associate Rolando Masferrer Rojas who is of dubious reputation and is well known for several nefarious actions in Haiti, Guatemala and perhaps elsewhere. Rolando Masferrer was convicted of conspiracy to invade Haiti in 1967. It is believed that there are extensive Agency files on Rolando Masferrer.
2. Masferrer was very reluctant to provide details, but finally said he could be reached at local telephone 261-3689. A separate check reveals this number to be registered to Denial Bermudez, 6080 W. Flagler, Apartment #17.
3. In any event the listed line caller indicated that he had been approached by one Guillermo Iglesias and asked to engage in certain activities which he did not further describe. According to Masferrer, Iglesias carried credentials or other identifying material which seemed to link him with the U.S. Coast Guard in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Masferrer said, however, that Iglesias indicated also that he was in some way representing the Central Intelligence Agency. Masferrer then said that the purpose of the telephone call was to check on the bona fides of Guillermo Iglesias.
4. Masferrer was told that the name Guillermo Iglesias meant nothing to the [ ] Office and was otherwise given a rather non-committal response.

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Classified by: 007622  
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category: 1B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

CONFIDENTIAL

16-88-46

Chief, Washington Field Office

12 July 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (DCS)

A-168846

A-168762

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Military Armament Corporation, Powder Springs, Georgia

REF : Van Happer/ [ ] telecons

A 127900

1. Attached per referent telephone conversations is copy of Dun and Bradstreet report as requested on Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Powder Springs, Georgia. Please note that Chairman of the Board, is Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III. Werbell is a former Office of Strategic Services (OSS) officer known to this writer during assignments in China during WWII.

2. This Agency, as well as other government agencies, have considerable information on Werbell. He is an old and unsavory, unsolicited, contact of the Miami Field Office dating from 1959. He is of dubious character and reputation who had and has been involved in grandiose schemes and international arms deals. He has had perpetual financial difficulties.

3. Werbell was involved with Rolando Masferrer Senior, in connection with the abortive Haitian invasion in 1967. This may throw a different light on possible source development of young Rolando Jr. Any approach to him should be executed with some degree of caution. We do not desire to get involved with Werbell. However, we cannot foresee any objection to planned debriefings of Masferrer Jr., following his trips to Latin America and other areas, in pursuit of PFI and possible information of operational significance.

4. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment

[ ]/11A

cc: Services Division, (Control)

FILED: HM 23880

CONFIDENTIAL

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON APPROVAL OF DCI

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE BY (1), (2), (3) or (4) (DATE AND BY WHOM)

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED



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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F 77-260

Document Description: \_\_\_\_\_

Dated: 10 June 1977

Document Located By: DCD

(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

Document referred to DDO for review by: \_\_\_\_\_

RECOMMEND:

- \_\_\_\_\_ Release in full-text
- \_\_\_\_\_ Release in sanitized form
- \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in toto
- \_\_\_\_\_ Defer decision to \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordination with \_\_\_\_\_ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from a foreign liaison service	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(e)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> File number	(b) (2)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(e)
<input type="checkbox"/> Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1)(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(j) (1)(f)
<input type="checkbox"/> Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1)(c)
* <input type="checkbox"/> Other, specify:		

\*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HLT-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

Rev. 9/21/77  
 SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE  
DCD  
May 77

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_  
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Chief, Washington Field Office

16-88-152  
16 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service, OSS

Rolando Masferrer, Jr. - Possible Source Lead *A*

1. Attached for your information and whatever interest you may have in this source lead from HH/3/Venezuela

2. On the basis of the information submitted, Mr. Masferrer, Jr., may be a useful source of FPI.

3. Suggest you arrange contact to obtain routine biographic data to initiate security checks; determine his intelligence potential and explain the DCS mission, without revealing in any way the past relationship with                     . Subject's personality profile appears to be very interesting.

4. It appears that the Clandestine Service is not repeat not interested in subject's operational potential at this time. We leave this in your capable hands to determine what course of action you may wish to contemplate in this matter.

JAMES H. MURPHY

                    /dms  
cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed: HH 23880

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DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/IR Request No. F 77-260

Document Description: \_\_\_\_\_

Dated: \_\_\_\_\_

Document Located By: DCD  
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Document referred to DDO for review by: \_\_\_\_\_

RECOMMEND:

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- Release in sanitized form
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- Coordination with \_\_\_\_\_ prior to above denial/release.

*Administrative reference*

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( ) Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( ) Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1) (c)
*( ) Other, specify:		

\*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HM-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

*Prod 5/11/77*  
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Chief, Washington Field Office

28 June 1972

Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)

B-67-52

Rolando Masferrer Jr., Possible Source Lead

A # 168846

REFERENCES: A) Memorandum for the Record dated 12 June 1972; Same Subject  
B) Van Happer/[ ] telecon

1. In regard to referent telephone conversation of recent date, [ ] (un/c/s/m/m/a) for additional assessment information on Rolando Masferrer, Jr., Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, headquartered in Georgia.

2. [ ] is a young "career trainee" who has been with the Agency for about six months. He met Masferrer in Miami, Florida, where both belonged to a Florida National Guard Unit. Peterson knows Masferrer socially as well having met frequently for "snacks and beer".

A # 168762

3. According to [ ] based on his observations, subject is a personable, intelligent, individual who appears trustworthy, and of sound mind and judgment. He is a solid citizen completely assimilated in the American mainstream; intensely interested in the U.S. political processes. Politically, he is of moderate conservative persuasion. He is an astute businessman of demonstrated ability and integrity. To highlight this point, [ ] mentioned that Masferrer spurned lucrative cash offers for "under the table" deals to engage in illegal weapons trade in Latin America. He refused these offers to operate in legitimate business circles.

4. Young Rolando takes a sociable drink; has no known bad habits. He has a keen eye for attractive females, but no more so than all healthy males. [ ] said he would not hesitate to recommend subject for a position of trust and confidence.

5. Rolando Masferrer, Jr. served with the Green Berets, elite U.S. Army unit whose members require special security clearances by the military.

6. [ ] underlined his previous statement that Rolando should not be confused with his father, Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, a former Cuban Senator who was leader of the notorious "Los Tigres", the dreaded army of enforcers under Batista.

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downgrading and  
declassification

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7. [ ] believed, and we are inclined to agree, that Rolando Jr., may be a good candidate for source development. He will be located at 905 L'Enfant Plaza, Washington, D.C., as the representative of Military Armaments Co. He will also represent Paraballum Corporation another military weapons firm.

8. Dun and Bradstreet reports were requested from New York and a copy will be forwarded when received.

JAMES R. MURPHY

[ ]/lla  
cc: Services Division (Control)  
FILED: HM 2380  
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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/PA Request No. F77-260

Document Description: Memo

Dated: 12 June 1972

Document Located By: DCB  
(OFFICE DESIGNATION)

7 July 1972 (2)  
6 July 1972

Document referred to DDO for review by: \_\_\_\_\_

RECOMMEND:

- \_\_\_\_\_ Release in full-text
- \_\_\_\_\_ Release in sanitized form
- \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in toto
- Defer decision to WH Decision
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordination with \_\_\_\_\_ prior to above denial/release

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( ) Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
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( ) Other, specify:		

\*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5343, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

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[Signature]  
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6 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando Masferrer, Jr.

1. On Monday, 3 July 1972, from 2100 to 2400 hours at Clyde's Bar, Washington, D.C.; and Tuesday, 4 July 1972, from 1800 to 1600 hours, poolside, 7625 Matera St., Apt. 201, Falls Church, Virginia, the undersigned talked with Rolando Masferrer, Jr.

2. I mentioned to Masferrer that my superiors (supposedly in the State Department) were interested that some responsible U.S. Government authority be informed of his story regarding U.S. citizen involvement in drug trafficking and guerrilla training in Mexico. Masferrer said that last February he told the story up to that date to Miami, F.B.I. Agent Bob Dyer, and also certain information to U.S. Customs Bureau Agent Buchanan (fnu). Masferrer said he had not informed any government entities of events subsequent to February. I mentioned that such information was not necessarily within the unique purview of the State Department, but that my superiors would probably be interested in anything further.

3. Rolando Masferrer, Jr., related to me four different occasions when an insurgent organization, "Force Seven", comprised of American adventurers in Mexico, was brought to his attention.

4. The first time the Subject heard of "Force Seven" was from Francisco BRAVO (or Brabo) [WFI], Chief of Judicial Police, State of Morelos. Subject had met Bravo "a few years ago". They met again in Atlanta, Georgia, late December 1971, when Bravo came for a weapons demonstration at the Military Armament Corp, Powder Springs, Georgia, some 20 miles outside Atlanta. Bravo told Masferrer of the insurgency problem in the Mexican states of Morelos and Guerrero. Bravo mentioned the existence of "Force Seven". Bravo indicated his police

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1, 2, 3 or 4 (circle one or more)

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needed weapons to fight the insurgents and subsequently invited Masferrer and Arnaldo Aliengro (son of a former Cuban Senator, naturalized citizen, and Masferrer's partner in Parabolina Corporation) to come to Mexico. Bravo promised to introduce Masferrer and Aliengro to Mexican police authorities competent to purchase firearms.

5. Subject again heard the name "Force Seven" in Miami, January 1972, from Otilio CASTANEDA Pais, former First Vice-President of the Guatemalan Congress. [Castaneda was head of the Guatemalan civilian counter-insurgency forces in the Zacapa region during 1957-68, and, according to Masferrer, the chief of the Mano Blanca. Castaneda was killed 12 June 1972. The Guatemalan insurgent group, F.A.R., "took credit" for the killing.] Castaneda was travelling to the U.S. with Messers. Sandoval and Figaroa. [Probably Mario SANDOVAL Alarcón, President of the Guatemalan Congress and head of the U.L.I. party; and Aivaro CUEVAS Figaroa, Castaneda's predecessor as First Vice-President of Congress. Several TROS reports during January and February 1972 indicated Cuevas Figaroa was trying to smuggle arms from the U.S. to Guatemala supposedly for a planned coup in Costa Rica] Masferrer said Castaneda was trying to arrange the release from U.S. Federal prison Rolando Masferrer, Sr. Castaneda wanted Masferrer, Sr., to emigrate to Guatemala to become involved in state security matters and also to organize an anti-Communist army. Castaneda mentioned to Masferrer, Jr., the growing insurgency problems in the Peten area of Guatemala. Castaneda mentioned that U.S. insurgents operating under the name "Force Seven" entered the Peten from Mexico. The Guatemalan Army's Mariscal Zavala Brigade had been dispatched from Guatemala City to the Mexican border in Peten province to counter the infiltration, but had recently been shifted to the border adjacent British Honduras. Masferrer said Castaneda believed that former U.S. "Green Berets" were involved with the insurgents. Castaneda said that a list of all U.S. Special Forces-trained Guatemalans had disappeared when the U.S. military training mission was terminated. Now the guerrillas in Guatemala are pinpointing those U.S. trained, local military personnel with uncanny accuracy. From that evidence, Castaneda believed that "Force Seven" must include some of the U.S. "Green Berets" that had originally trained the local Guatemalan military.

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6. During the first three months of 1972, Subject made two trips to Mexico. During his first trip, three weeks in late January and February, Masferrer travelled with Allegro and Mitchell Merbell (Mitchell Livingston Merbell III, 201-259010, former G-2 member in S-8-1 in World War II; former President of Military Armament Corporation; and presently associated with Defense Systems Incorporated, Poudre Springs, Colorado.) In Mexico City, Francisco Bravo introduced the Agent to Mexico City Police Chief Santos (Daniel GUTIERREZ Santos) and Miguel NAZAR Haro, "Chief of Political Police". [Actually Deputy Director of the Federal Security Service, DFS, a political and intelligence organization working within the Secretariat of Government.] During conversations Nazar admitted Mexico's insurgency problems and specifically named "Force Seven". Masferrer mentioned that both Nazar and Gutierrez Santos were angry with President Echeverria because of the Mexican Government's policy of light criminal punishment and short prison terms for bandits and/or guerrillas pain-takingly captured by the police.

7. Bravo took the three to Cuernavaca where he showed them a house on the outskirts of the city that the police used for unofficial detentions and heavy-handed interrogations. Bravo complained that the local Catholic Archbishop was implicated with the insurgents as well as certain U.S. film personalities who vacation in the American community in Cuernavaca. Bravo also implicated a professor that was kidnapped in Guerrero in late 1971. Bravo believed that the professor [Jaime CASTREJON Diaz, Rector of the University of Guerrero] actually conspired with the insurgents for his own kidnapping in order to raise the ransom money for the insurgent movement. [The ransom was finally paid by President Echeverria.]

8. Subject travelled again to Mexico in March 1972 with Bernardo DE TORRES. [Mexico 2038, 4 December 1969, mentions that LYTENPO-12, WH/WIWH, received a phone call from one Bernardo De Torres regarding a supposed Swiss contraband arms dealer in Mexico City.] Nazar had invited Masferrer to return to Mexico to go on a "hunting party", that is, to participate in an actual counter-insurgency operation. Masferrer and De Torres arrived in Acapulco and were met by Bravo. They travelled by police vehicle for about an hour east of Acapulco to an area near La Treintas (NFI).

- 3 -

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Just before they arrived they heard on the police radio that the Army had just "shot down" a twin-engine Beechcraft. When they arrived, a search of the wreckage yielded a few weapons. A short firefight (about 15 minutes) ensued with insurgents that left two soldiers dead. Masferrer said he did not know the number of insurgent casualties. One insurgent was captured along with his .45 caliber pistol.

9. The captured insurgent turned out to be a U.S. citizen, white, male, approximately 27 years old. (Masferrer claimed he forgot the prisoner's name, but that he had it in Miami.) Bravo did not trust the Acapulco or the Guerrero state police and had his men take the prisoner to the detention house outside of Cuernavaca. Masferrer said he witnessed the interrogation in which the prisoner's head was repeatedly dunked in a rain barrel to make him talk. The prisoner eventually revealed the following information about "Force Seven": participating Americans were ex-ranger, airborne, Marine or Special Forces types, many with Vietnam combat experience. They were armed with CAR-15 (M-16) rifles and some had M-79 grenade launchers. Other Americans operated elsewhere in Latin America. "Force Seven" provided training to the insurgents and, whenever possible, supplied weapons. In return, the Americans were paid in money and drugs, mostly marijuana, but some cocaine. Masferrer said no heroin was mentioned. The prisoner said the insurgents used the money from the drug smuggling to finance operations. Bank robberies had become increasingly difficult since the Army began posting armed guards at army banks. The prisoner said he had worked under Genaro VASQUEZ [Mexico's infamous bandit-turned-guerrilla; killed in a car accident last February]. The prisoner put guerrilla strength at about 2,000 men. Masferrer, however, said Bravo felt that figure to be high. The prisoner also mentioned that some of the insurgents had previously received guerrilla training in North Korea.

10. Masferrer said that later, upon Nazar's orders, the American prisoner was shot and killed. The whole affair was never reported in the local press because, according to Masferrer, such information, if revealed, would damage the area's tourist trade.

SECRET 23880

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12 June 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Rolando MASFERRER, Jr.

1. Please be informed of a possible future contact--Rolando MASFERRER, Jr., recently promoted to Vice-President of Sales, Military Armament Corporation, Washington D.C. office, 905 L' Enfant Plaza, #4020. He is also associated with Parabellum Corporation, another military weapons firm. Subject, born approximately 1945, in Habana, Cuba, is believed to be a naturalized citizen.
2. Subject makes frequent sales trips to Latin America. Because of the nature of his main product (machine pistols with silencers) he has good access to top Latin American governmental officials and military and security officers. He has personally met many Latin American presidents. He should be a good source of information on the current status of arms sales in Latin America; internal security, military armament levels, order-of-battle, and internal politics in host countries; and, if needed, status of Cuban exile movement. He is presently on a sales mission to Colombia and is scheduled to return in mid-June.
3. MASFERRER, Jr. has been a Miami resident since 1959 and more recently lived in Atlanta. He will permanently locate in the Washington, D.C. area when he returns from his Colombian trip.
4. Subject is not to be confused with his father by the same name, the infamous Rolando Arcadio MASFERRER y Rojas (201-42669). Masferrer Sr. was a former Cuban Senator and leader of a dreaded private army of Batista enforcers called "Los Tigres (The Tigers)". He is presently serving in a U.S. federal prison for attempting to organize a 1967 invasion of Haiti in order to set up a base of operations against Cuba. Masferrer Sr., violently anti-Castro, was involved in numerous Cuban exile operations against Cuba during the last decade.
5. I was Subject's Commanding Officer in the Florida National Guard and sometimes saw him socially while in Miami. Although Cuban by birth, he now feels that he is an American. Politically anti-Communist, he joined the National Guard (while not under duress from the draft) to become a "Green Beret." He is polite and correct in his social relationships. I received a letter from him, 7 June 1972, informing me of his impending move to the Washington, D.C. area. He

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solicited my aid in finding a local army reserve unit.

6. If you are interested in exploring this possibility further, please feel free to contact me at any time. I could suggest cautions and method of contact or introduction. Subject is unwitting of my Agency employment.

[REDACTED]

WR/3/V

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Central / raw  
cc Washington  
28 Jul 72  
LHM

16-88-46

7 July 1972

A 168846

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Assessment of Recruitability - Rolando Masferrer, Jr.  
Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corporation  
and Associated with Defense Systems Incorporated

A 168762

1. Subject seems to have inherited that particular Latin American penchant for involvement in covert political activities. However, the Subject's involvement is not merely operative or transactional but it is instead intimately connected with his chosen profession as an arms salesman. Here the phrase "for fun and profit" seems aptly suited. He seems to be a man of action with the ability to exploit an opportunity, rather than a towering intellect.

2. Subject has excellent contacts and access in Latin America. This access developed from his extended family, professional appointments, and his involvement with Cuban exile groups. His family is well-known (infamous) throughout many sectors of Latin America and opens many doors for him (although it also closes others). It should also be mentioned that his family has recently developed a rather checkered association with this Agency. The particular nature of his military products gives him contact with high military, police, and security officials throughout Latin America. He seems to be well versed on the status of various arms deals (both official and under-the-table) in the countries he travels. He has been involved with several Cuban exile political and para-military organizations.

3. Politically, Subject is a staunch anti-Communist. This position is probably ingrained from his family, but also reinforced from his various political and professional activities. He has voiced a particular hatred for Cuban Communists. He seems to view them not as respected enemies, but as hated traitors. He is vehemently anti-Castro.

6-1391

4. Subject has developed what could be interpreted as a certain patriotism for this country. During conversations he referred a few times to "my country" meaning the U.S. I believe that the fact he volunteered for U.S. military training reflects not only the selfish motives of becoming Special Forces qualified but also a sense of duty. I also believe that his recent statements to me regarding international security matters is not merely empty loquacity but is evidence of his desire to contribute something and become involved in the national interest.

5. Subject would need sober briefings on the responsibility of any Agency association as well as subsequent careful handling. He would need to get away from the "Flagler Street Commando syndrome" of visual and verbal bravado. He would need instruction to discern rumor from fact, to identify sources, and to assess the reliability of acquired information.

6. I am sure that the Subject is recruitable. The question is what degree of association with the Agency would be appropriate. If the decision is made to approach the Subject, may I suggest that his association be initially limited to Agency briefings and debriefings before and after his trips to Latin America. Once his reliability is established and the accuracy of his reporting is proven then further utilization may be possible. Since his financial situation seems to be secure I am sure he could be handled on a non-pay basis.

7. Subject is scheduled to leave on a two-week business trip to Venezuela and Colombia beginning in early August 1972. He claimed to have appointments with a Venezuelan Air Force General and with Venezuelan national security officials in DISIP.

7 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Conversation with  
Eduardo MacFerrer, Jr.

1. On Sunday, 2 July 1973, from 1800 to 2000 hours at the Shanghai Restaurant, Arlington, Va., I met with Eduardo MacFerrer, Jr. MacFerrer is admitting of my former employment. My cover story is that I am a Program Officer with the State Department. I supposedly work in a research capacity for the American Republics Area until the time I can be programmed to enter the next Foreign Service Institute class.)

2. MacFerrer and I, old National Guard comrades, had not seen one another for 5 months. We had dinner and later went on a tour of apartment sites in the District and northern Virginia. During the course of the conversation, he related the events of his trips to Mexico and his recent trip (June 1972) to Colombia in the course of his job as Vice-President, Sales, Military Armament Corp.

Mexico: Subject mentioned the trouble the Mexican Government is having with leftist guerrillas, particularly in two western states. He claimed the rebels were being trained in part by U.S. adventurers who claimed to be ex-ranger, airborne Marine or Special Forces types, many with Vietnam experience. The Americans were training the rebels in return for money and marijuana and a piece of the drug smuggling action. The Americans operated under the non de guerre "Force Seven". This same "Force Seven" claimed to have connections and affiliations in Guatemala. Subject claimed even to have participated in a small firefight with the Mexican Army and the Judicial Police against the guerrillas in an effort to prove the worth of his particular military products.

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE  
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OTHERWISE (1) (2) (3) or (4) (date and by whom)

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Colombia: Subject mentioned Colombia's increasing alarm with the problems of drug trafficking within the country. While in Colombia he claimed to have spoken in the house of his family friend MG Jaime FOMBI Perdo, Chief of Staff of the Colombian Army.

2. The entire conversation was kept on the level of buddies swapping war stories. Subject, however, swore to the veracity of his statements. I mentioned that the State Department was currently interested in the problems of drug trafficking in Latin America and maybe there would be some interest in pursuing the matter further. I also indicated I would ask my superiors at the State Department if they had ever heard anything about the existence of a "Force Seven" or anything of the various activities of U.S. drug smugglers, drug smuggling, and leftist guerrilla movements in Mexico.

3. On Monday, 3 July 1972, I coordinated with the following people at Headquarters:

[redacted], Acting Desk Chief, Colombia  
Richard Wheeler and John Murray, Branch 1, Mexico  
[redacted], C/WH/PI  
[redacted], WH/NARC

Their collective suggestions and instructions were:

- a. Go slow on efforts to elicit information so not to arouse suspicions of Agency involvement.
- b. Find out any information regarding the Colombian Army's E-2 battalion, U.S. citizen's involvement in drug trafficking in Latin America (names, dates, and places), Cuban involvement in cocaine traffic, and any ties between leftist guerrillas and drug smuggling.
- c. Write a memorandum and Subject evaluation (where he works, where he goes, who he meets, and an assessment of recruitability).

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4. I made arrangements to meet McFerron again  
the evening of 3 July 1972 and the afternoon of 4 July  
1972.



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TOP SECRET

INITIAL REVIEW FORM

FOIA/EE Request No. E-17-260

Document Description: 7-13-1957

Dated: 21 June 1977

Document Located By: DCD  
OFFICE DESIGNATION

Document referred to DDO for review by: \_\_\_\_\_

RECOMMEND:

- Release in full-text
- Release in sanitized form
- Deny in toto
- Defer decision to \_\_\_\_\_
- Coordination with \_\_\_\_\_ prior to above denial/release

*as per the request  
to deny in toto  
is correct*

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Classification	(b) (1)	(k) (1)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from a foreign liaison service	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b) (c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (c)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> File number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1) (c)
<input type="checkbox"/> Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1) (b)
<input type="checkbox"/> FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1) (b)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Privacy of other individual	(b) (6)	(j) (1) (d)
<input type="checkbox"/> Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
<input type="checkbox"/> Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1) (c)
* <input type="checkbox"/> Other, specify:		

\*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDA-75-5043, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HJN-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

DCD  
SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER & OFFICE  
May 77

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_  
(To be completed by ISS/PICG)

E 2 IMPDET CL BY: \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

TOP SECRET

F-16-88-46

SECRET

OSS-820-73  
31 May 1973

Chief, [redacted] Office

Director, Domestic Contact Service (Support Division/OSS)

Rolando Masferrer

REF :

[redacted]

ROLANDO MASFERRER

1. Attached for your information and background orientation is some material pertaining to Rolando Masferrer, who appears to be identical to subject of reference.

2. Subject should not be confused with his uncle by the same name, the infamous Rolando Masferrer y Rojas (erroneously reported as father of subject). The elder Masferrer was imprisoned in 1957 for organizing an unsuccessful invasion of Haiti. Young Masferrer may be engaged in dubious activity and contact with him should be viewed with cautious circumspection. He may be on a "fishing expedition" to obtain some information on Guillermo Iglesias; or he may be seeking to cement an affiliation with the Agency via the Miami Field Office. Masferrer may not be the good guy that the attached material represents him to be. He is known to be a wheeling and dealing fast dollar artist. Should he volunteer any information in the future, please note it, and send it to Headquarters. Of specific interest would be any information he may provide on narcotic trafficking and those involved in this illicit trade.

3. DDO has no interest in young Masferrer. If we can be of further assistance, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment

[redacted] /ds

cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed HH 23880

E-2 DUPDET CL BY 004476

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INITIAL REVIEW FORM

Document Description: Comp (C) 30110-11    FOIA Request No. 87-246  
 Document Located By: XXXX    Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Document referred to EOC for review by: \_\_\_\_\_  
*Changes to report*  
*Request to release*  
*Coordinate with agency about -*  
*any necessary*  
*discuss with the request*

RECOMMEND:  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Release in full-text  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Release in sanitized form  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Deny in toto  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Deferral decision to \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Coordination with \_\_\_\_\_ prior to above denial/release

EXEMPTIONS ARE BEING CLAIMED TO PROTECT THE FOLLOWING:

	FOIA	PRIVACY
( ) Classification	(b) (1)	(b) (1)
( ) Information from a foreign government source	(b) (3)	(b) (1)(b)(c)
( ) Information pertaining to a foreign liaison relationship	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)(c)
( ) Information which would/could identify the source	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
( ) Information pertaining to a source	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
( ) Information pertaining to intelligence methods	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
( ) Location of CIA overseas installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
( ) Location of unacknowledged domestic installation	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
( ) Name of CIA employee	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(e)
( ) File number	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
( ) Pseudonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
( ) Cryptonym	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(b)
( ) Internal organizational data	(b) (3)	(j) (1)(e)
( ) Name of an FBI agent	(b) (7)	(j) (1)(b)
( ) FBI file number	(b) (2)	(j) (1)(b)
( ) Privacy of other individual	(b) (5)	(j) (1)(f)
( ) Does not pertain to request	N/A	"Exempted portions are not relevant to the requester"
( ) Information from another Government agency	(b) (1)	(j) (1)(c)
* ( ) Other, specify:		

\*For further guidance regarding exemptions, please see DDM-75-5943, 16 December 1975 (Privacy Act) and HR-70-21, 14 February 1975 (FOIA).

COMMENTS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS.

*Chris Elliott*  
 SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICER'S OFFICE

Document No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 (To be completed by ISS/PIIC)

FORM 2 ENDDT CL BY: \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED     CONFIDENTIAL     SECRET     TOP SECRET

ACCESS SHEET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY										FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY														
C. CASE NUMBER					FOR REPORTING					EXCHANGE					RELEASED									
1A	1B	1C	1D	1E	2A	2B	2C	2D	2E	3A	3B	3C	3D	3E	4A	4B	4C	4D	4E					
Possible False Recruitment Effort										EXCHANGE RECORD					RELEASED									
E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)										INDIVIDUAL NO.					TYPE CODE									
Rolando Masferrer c/o Daniel Bonander 6080 W. Flagler, Apt 17 Miami, Florida															CLASSIFIED, EXCHG. PUBLICATIONS, REPORTS, ETC.									
F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)										ORGANIZATION NO.					SUBJECT									
Same															S. SOURCE									
G. SUB-SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)										INDIVIDUAL NO.					L. C. O.									
															S. C. O.									
H. METHOD OF COLLECTION										EVALUATION					USSR ONLY EXCHANGES					RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS				
<input type="checkbox"/> INTERVIEW <input type="checkbox"/> TRIP REPORT															NO									
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER DOCUMENT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER (specify below)															TO USER					FROM USSR				
Call-in																				with				
DIRECTED TO										HEADQUARTERS COMMENTS														
FIELD COMMENTS										FYI and Possible Interest										HH-23880				
Our colleagues have asked us to report this brief item in order to put it in the system.										Copies to:					WH/C/FI - 3-D-38									
															WH/CI - 3-B-001									
															WH/CI - 3-D-46									
																				7-014A				
										Release your calls were Rolando Masferrer found in the notes of the various Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y. Rojas, among in a US federal union in organization (1967) mission in Haiti. Rolando was associated with the CIA. They also of Rolando (liberal) and was with a brother in some books and.														
E 2 REPORT CL NY 0044751										F.O. CHIEF					DIVISION AT FLESH									

DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

DATE 25 May 1973

COUNTRY Cuba/Haiti

NO. PAGES 1

SUBJECT Possible False Recruitment Effort

REFERENCES

## OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to personnel outside of the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

1. At 1750 hours on 14 May 1973 the [REDACTED] Office received a telephone call on the listed line from an individual who ultimately identified himself as Rolando Masferrer. It is believed that Masferrer is identical with former Cuban senator and Batista associate Rolando Masferrer Rojas who is of dubious reputation and is well known for several nefarious actions in Haiti, Guatemala and perhaps elsewhere. Rolando Masferrer was convicted of conspiracy to invade Haiti in 1967. It is believed that there are extensive Agency files on Rolando Masferrer.
2. Masferrer was very reluctant to provide details, but finally said he could be reached at local telephone 251-3639. A separate check reveals this number to be registered to Rafael Bernudes, 6030 N. Flagler, Apartment 917.
3. In any event the listed line caller indicated that he had been approached by one Guillermo Iglesias and asked to engage in certain activities which he did not further describe. According to Masferrer, Iglesias carried credentials or other identifying material which seemed to link him with the U.S. Coast Guard in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Masferrer said, however, that Iglesias indicated also that he was in some way representing the Central Intelligence Agency. Masferrer then said that the purpose of the telephone call was to check on the bona fides of Guillermo Iglesias.
4. Masferrer was told that the name Guillermo Iglesias meant nothing to the Miami Field Office and was otherwise given a rather non-committal response.

- 2 -

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SECRET  
(When Filled In)

16-88-46

PROCESS SET FOR DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE COLLECTIONS

FOR FIELD USE ONLY				FOR HEADQUARTERS USE ONLY															
A. FIELD OFFICE				B. RECORDS				C. CASE NUMBER				D. FORWARDED TO				E. RECEIVED			
1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
XMIH				00-400				07103				2026573				J U O 24 25 26			
D. SUBJECT NAME																			
Guillermo Iglesias/Attempts to Raise Money Under Agency Suspense																			
(Colombia/Venezuela/Cuba)																			
E. CONTACT (Name, Title, Organization, Address)																			
Rolando MASFATER 6030 W. Flagler Avenue Miami, Florida																			
F. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)																			
Same																			
G. SOURCE (Name, Title, Organization, Address)																			
Same																			
H. METHOD OF COLLECTION																			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INTERVIEW <input type="checkbox"/> TRIP REPORT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER DOCUMENT <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify Below)																			
I. EVALUATION REQUESTED FROM																			
<input type="checkbox"/> USSR ONLY EXCEPTS (CHECK ONE) <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> TO USSR <input type="checkbox"/> FROM USSR																			
RESPONSIVE TO SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS																			
WH																			
DIRECTED TO																			
ALIEN <input type="checkbox"/> CIS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SOV <input type="checkbox"/> INT <input type="checkbox"/> CASE OFFICER																			
FIELD COMMENTS																			
<p>Our [ ] colleagues wish us to report on Iglesias and record these developments.</p> <p>HH 25263            WIIKOG/OS - 4D 46.            ATTN: CIVIL RIGHTS - 040</p> <p>Iglesias is certainly a fraud and should come to the attention of the FBI and police authorities. MASFATER should also be known to your office since we and some background info on him to ATTN F.O. He is a phony operator. Be very cautious in your dealings with him.</p>																			
J. APPROVAL																			
K. DIVISIONAL OFFICER																			



## OPERATIONAL INFORMATION REPORT

This report has been prepared by the DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE, DDI. The operational information contained herein may not be disclosed to the CLANDESTINE SERVICE, CIA, without the prior permission of the Domestic Contact Service.

1. On 26 June 1973 the [redacted] Office responded to a call on the listed line from a man who identified himself as Roberto Mantecor. Mr. Mantecor requested to meet [redacted] of the [redacted] Office. Mr. Mantecor said that he had a few operations concerning [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] were known to be of interest to the Central Intelligence Agency. Roberto Mantecor lives at 6080 N. Biscayne Avenue, Miami, Florida. As a result of his request [redacted] and [redacted] of the [redacted] Office responded to the call and met with Roberto Mantecor that afternoon.
2. Mr. Mantecor related details of his relationship with one Guillermo Yglesias, age about 38, an individual on whom there are other Agency references. According to Mantecor, Yglesias approached him in June March 1973 and identified himself as working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Yglesias said that he was trying to recruit a large sum of money to finance covert CIA operations. Yglesias said that CIA funds have been tied up as a result of the Watergate affair. He referred to these operations as black operations. Mr. Mantecor said that he knew several high ranking government officials in Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala. Mantecor contacted several of these officials in South America and asked them to aid the Central Intelligence Agency in raising funds for covert operations in South America and the Caribbean. Mantecor has contacted Manuel Vega, a retired Colombian army colonel and presently head of the Colombian Internal Police. He has also contacted one Alvaro Rivas, who is an officer in command of the Colombian Internal Police. Mantecor also passed Yglesias the name of Carlos Mendez, head of the Venezuelan Internal Police. Yglesias showed a great interest in small arms of all types. Mantecor said that he personally turned over nine M-16 semiautomatic hand grenades, one M-16 automatic rifle, one AR-15 semi-automatic rifle, and several handguns 38 caliber type. Mantecor was led to believe that the weapons would be used in a covert CIA operation in Puerto Rico. This operation was described by Yglesias as a black operation.
3. During our conversation with Mantecor, he raised an additional point. Mantecor said that he contacted Manuel Vega in Colombia and that Vega agreed to help all that he could. Vega expressed deep concern to



F-16-88-46

SECRET

OSS-820-73  
31 May 1973

Chief, [ ] Office

Director, Domestic Contact Service (Support Division/OSS)

Rolando Masferrer

REF :

[ ]

ROLANDO MASFERRER

1. Attached for your information and background orientation is some material pertaining to Rolando Masferrer, who appears to be identical to subject of reference.

2. Subject should not be confused with his uncle by the same name, the infamous Rolando Masferrer y Rojas (erroneously reported as father of subject). The elder Masferrer was imprisoned in 1967 for organizing an unsuccessful invasion of Haiti. Young Masferrer may be engaged in dubious activity and contact with him should be viewed with cautious circumspection. He may be on a "fishing expedition" to obtain some information on Guillermo Iglesias; or he may be seeking to cement an affiliation with the Agency via the Miami Field Office. Masferrer may not be the good guy that the attached material represents him to be. He is known to be a wheeling and dealing fast dollar artist. Should he volunteer any information in the future, please note it, and send it to Headquarters. Of specific interest would be any information he may provide on narcotic trafficking and those involved in this illicit trade.

3. DDO has no interest in young Masferrer. If we can be of further assistance, please advise.

JAMES R. MURPHY

Attachment

[ ] ds

cc: Services Division (Control)

Filed HH 23880

E-2 IMPDET CL BY 004476

SECRET